Section 9 (3) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Lagos State 2011 stands out as a commendable provision within Nigeria’s criminal justice framework. It mandates the Police to ensure that the process of obtaining a confessional statement is documented either through video recording or, if video facilities are unavailable, in writing in the presence of a legal practitioner chosen by the suspect. Furthermore, it stipulates that both the recording and copies thereof may be presented during the trial. Comparable provisions can also be found in Sections 15 (4) and 17 (1) and (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015.
The primary objective behind these provisions is to put an end to the practice of extracting confessions through force and coercion by the police and subsequently using these coerced confessions as evidence in court. Despite the laudable nature of these provisions, their non-enforcement and disregard by both the police and the courts over the years rendered them essentially ineffective.
In the case of Charles v. State of Lagos (Supra), the Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s convictions of the Appellant for armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. A key issue before the Supreme Court was whether it was appropriate for the Court of Appeal to uphold the Appellant’s conviction based on Exhibit 4, his purported confessional statement. This statement, while admissible, was deemed invalid and impotent due to its violation of the mandatory provision in Section 9(3) of the Administration of Criminal Law of Lagos State.
Although Justice M. D. Muhammad (JSC) did not directly address this issue in the leading judgment, Justice Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju JSC, in her concurring judgment, resolved it in favour of the Appellant. She rejected the argument made by the Respondent’s Counsel that the Appellant’s appeal was not based on the trial court’s ruling regarding the voluntariness of the confessional statement but rather on the trial court’s failure to apply the provisions of Section 9 (3) of the ACJL during the trial within trial. Justice Ogunwumiju (JSC) asserted that such an argument was irrelevant, as the failure to apply existing law to a set of facts could lead to a miscarriage of justice and was appealable as a matter of law, regardless of the wording of the ground of appeal.
Justice Ogunwumiju, in her interpretation of Section 9 (3) of the ACJL, emphasized the mandatory nature of the provision, as indicated by the use of the word “shall.” The primary aim of this provision is to prevent the extraction of confessions through torture and duress, thereby ensuring the protection of a defendant’s constitutional rights, as enshrined in Section 35 (2) of the CFRN (as amended). Any confessional statement recorded in violation of this provision is deemed void and ineffectual.
Additionally, Justice Ogunwumiju clarified that the word “may” used in the ACJA regarding procedural safeguards for receiving confessional statements from suspects should also be understood as mandatory, aligning with the Court of Appeal’s similar opinion in Nnajiofor v. FRN (2018) LPELR-43925(CA).
The court stressed that the purpose of video/audio-visual evidence was to allow the court to assess the voluntariness of the confessional statement by observing the defendant’s demeanour and the surrounding circumstances. The court lamented the non-compliance with these provisions by the police and other security agencies, despite the widespread availability of recording technology, considering such non-compliance as inexcusable.
Drawing lessons from other jurisdictions like the United Kingdom and Australia, the Supreme Court emphasized that compliance with procedural safeguards for obtaining confessions from suspects was legally and judicially established. In Australia, for instance, the admissibility of confessions or admissions hinges on the existence of a video recording, with certain exceptions.
In summary, the Supreme Court regarded the inclusion of these provisions in Nigerian statutes as commendable but expressed dismay at their lack of implementation. It strongly criticized the casual attitude of the Court of Appeal towards this issue and ultimately allowed the Appellant’s appeal.
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