The “neighbour principle,” established in the landmark case Donoghue v Stevenson (1932), served as the foundation and conceptual cornerstone for the development of negligence law in the twentieth century. The seemingly trivial facts of the case—involving two friends at a café, where one discovered a decomposed snail in a bottle of ginger beer bought by the other—mask the significance of the decision made by the House of Lords. This discussion examines the principle articulated by Lord Atkin to define the boundaries of the duty of care in negligence, within the context of other relevant case law.
In Donoghue v Stevenson, the House of Lords found it necessary to address the issues created by privity of contract to provide an alternative means for an injured party to claim compensation. Since Mrs. Donoghue’s friend was the one who purchased the ginger beer that caused her injury, only the friend had the right to sue under the contract. The House of Lords resolved this issue by imposing liability in negligence on the café owner, stating that liability could be established if a duty of care existed between the owner (the tortfeasor) and the victim (Mrs. Donoghue). Lord Atkin defined the scope of this duty of care with the following often-quoted terms:
“You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.”
The neighbour principle thus enables injured parties to make claims in negligence by identifying the group of people to whom a duty may be owed in any given situation. This group includes those who are sufficiently close to be directly affected by the allegedly negligent act and those whom the alleged tortfeasor should reasonably have considered when acting. It is evident that the principle does not open the floodgates to unlimited claims, as a tortfeasor will not owe a duty of care to individuals who are not within their reasonable contemplation at the time of the tortious act or omission.
For decades, the neighbour principle remained the predominant authority in this area of law. However, the title of this work prompts a discussion on whether the precedent set in Donoghue “provides an adequate basis on which to resolve duty of care questions.” The answer to this question is informed by subsequent judicial decisions on the matter.
Although the neighbour principle initially served as the primary guide for determining the extent of the duty of care, courts soon faced situations that required further refinement and elaboration of its basic premise. For instance, in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd (1964), which dealt with a negligent statement made by a bank rather than an act or omission, the House of Lords ruled that a plaintiff could establish a duty of care only if a special relationship existed between the parties. Lord Reid explained that such a special relationship could be identified:
“Where it is plain that the party seeking the information or advice was trusting the other to exercise such a degree of care as the circumstances required, where it was reasonable for him to do that, and where the other gave the information or advice when he knew or ought to have known that the enquirer was relying on him.”
Hedley Byrne thus expanded the law based on the neighbour principle. The law on the duty of care was further developed in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman (1990) by the House of Lords. In Caparo, Lord Devlin explained the Hedley Byrne ‘special relationship’ as one of close proximity, akin to a contractual relationship. Lord Bridge articulated the relevant policy in terms that have become almost as renowned as Lord Atkin’s original statement:
“In addition to the foreseeability of damage, necessary ingredients in any situation giving rise to a duty of care are that there should exist between the party owing the duty and the party to whom it is owed a relationship characterised by the law as one of ‘proximity’ or ‘neighbourhood’ and that the situation should be one in which the court considers it fair, just and reasonable that the court should impose a duty of a given scope upon the one party for the benefit of the other.”
In Caparo, the neighbour principle was effectively integrated into a broader tripartite test that considers foreseeability, proximity, and considerations of fairness and justice. Subsequent cases, such as McFarlane v Tayside Health Board (2000), D v East Berkshire Community NHS Trust and others [2003], and Vowles v Evans and Welsh Rugby Union Ltd (2003), have affirmed that determining the duty of care requires not only reference to the neighbour principle but also an examination of the nature of the relationship between the parties and whether it is fair, just, and reasonable to impose a duty of care in all the circumstances.
Lord Atkin introduced his explanation of the neighbour principle in Donoghue by stating:
“The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour;”
This was perhaps initially misleading because, as the Bible records, when Jesus Christ was asked, “Lord, who is my neighbour?” he replied, “Everyone is your neighbour.” However, the neighbour principle that Lord Atkin articulated in law is much more restricted and pragmatic.
The question of whether the neighbour principle provides an adequate basis for resolving duty of care questions is straightforward. The principle established in Donoghue certainly laid a strong foundation for addressing duty of care issues, but it was not an all-encompassing principle immune to further development and refinement. Subsequent case law, such as Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd (1964) and Caparo Industries plc v Dickman (1990), has expanded on the neighbour principle, adding substance to Lord Atkin’s original formulation.
For instance, the Caparo case confirmed that considerations of proximity and the fairness, justice, and reasonableness of imposing a duty of care should be assessed alongside the traditional neighbour principle when determining the existence of a duty of care in a particular case. This approach was endorsed by the House of Lords in the case of Sutradhar v Natural Environment Research Council (2006).
Since 1932, the evolution of duty of care law has been gradual, introducing new responsibilities over time. Policy considerations have played a significant role in determining duty of care, with judges entrusted to assess whether a duty is warranted in specific situations. Consequently, judges have occasionally deviated from a strict interpretation of the neighbour principle when faced with moral and practical complexities. An example of this is evident in Rondel v Worsley (1969), where the court declined to hold a barrister liable for his actions in court.
Norman Katter explores the ‘neighbour principle’ in his article “Who then in law is my neighbour”. He suggests that the quest for a universal formula to ascertain duty of care has circled back to its origins, with Lord Atkin’s ‘neighbour principle’ continuing to serve as the fundamental framework for determining duty of care. He states:
“A series of recent cases before the Full Bench of the High Court of Australia indicate a resurgence of the revered assertions of Lord Atkin, crafted some seventy years prior, as the foundational guide in determining the presence of duty of care in any given scenario. Despite various approaches emerging in the High Court over the past decade, which involve different combinations of principle, policy, and gradual development, none has proven to be a satisfactory universal determinant of duty of care in the expanding landscape of negligence litigation.”
Furthermore, Katter contends that alternative approaches, such as the incremental method reliant on established precedent, are flawed:
“The approaches seen in the High Court of Australia over the past decade encompass various blends of incremental development, principle, and policy. One such approach is the incremental or categories approach, which acknowledges a duty of care within distinct categories. This method relies on deduction and comparison with precedents within established duty categories.”
In conclusion, it is argued that while the neighbour principle served as a solid conceptual foundation for this area of law, subsequent case law has revealed its inadequacy for exclusive application. While the neighbour principle remains fundamental to the duty of care law, it has been supplemented and refined by judicial interpretation over time. Consequently, it should not be blindly adhered to or applied narrowly.